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Tadej Troha
On The Primal Scene 
HYPNOSIS REVISITED
It is a commonplace in the history of Freudian thought that psycho-
analysis proper began at the moment Freud finally abandoned the 
technique of hypnosis. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that it was 
Freud himself who in his own account of the history of the psychoana-
lytic movement set the ground of what was to become a doxa.
The theory of repression is the cornerstone on which the whole 
structure of psycho-analysis rests. It is the most essential part of 
it; and yet it is nothing but a theoretical formulation of a phe-
nomenon which may be observed as often as one pleases if one 
undertakes an analysis of a neurotic without resorting to hypnosis. In 
such cases one comes across a resistance which opposes the work 
of analysis and in order to frustrate it pleads a failure of memory. 
The use of hypnosis was bound to hide this resistance; the history 
of psycho-analysis proper, therefore, only begins with the new technique 
that dispenses with hypnosis.1
Hypnosis, as he put it in another text from the same year, deserves 
gratitude “for having brought before us single psychical processes 
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of analysis in an isolated or schematic form,” thereby giving “us the 
courage […] to create more complicated situations in the analytic 
treatment.”2 In this perspective, the transition from the one to the 
other technique appears completely linear. The new technique would 
not only prove to be an improvement over the failures of hypnosis. It 
could at the same time be seen as a further development of the latter, 
one that assumed all of its essential objectives and thus allowed Freud 
to leave the archaic, undeveloped stage in the past.
There is, however, an alternative line of thought present in 
Freud’s texts, one in which hypnosis keeps reappearing, reminding 
Freud of the fact that the development of psychoanalytic theory is 
just as non-linear as the development of the psyche of his patients. 
In its most condensed form, it is given in ‘Analysis Terminable and 
Interminable’:
Hypnotic influence seemed to be an excellent instrument for our 
purposes; but the reasons for our having to abandon it are well 
known. No substitute for hypnosis has yet been found.3 
It is quite telling that this remark relates to Freud’s very last great case 
history, precisely the one we would expect to display the accomplished 
stage of the new technique. The case that should have become the 
ultimate proof of its effectiveness proved to be a demonstration of its 
inherent hazard – the hazard of becoming static, of closing itself, of 
turning itself inward. 
According to Freud, the patient “remained for a long time un-
assailably entrenched behind an attitude of ‘obliging apathy’. He lis-
tened, understood, and remained unapproachable.” As the Wolf-Man 
himself put it in his memoires, he “felt [himself] less as a patient than 
as a co-worker, the younger comrade of an experienced explorer set-
ting out to study a new, recently discovered land.”4 The patient was 
obviously convinced that he was part of an unbinding theoretical di-
alogue, an equal partner in what he conceived of as scientific com-
munication. However, the Wolf-Man failed to notice that the other 
partner in the dialogue had already disappeared and mutated into a 
mere material support of his own objet a. The effects of transference 
therefore manifested only after Freud’s additional gesture, i.e. after his 
announcement that he would bring to a close the apparent dialogue 
to eliminate the remaining minimum of his own personal presence.
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I determined – but not until trustworthy signs had led me to 
judge that the right moment had come – that the treatment must 
be brought to an end at a particular fixed date, no matter how far 
it had advanced. I was resolved to keep to the date; and eventual-
ly the patient came to see that I was in earnest. Under the inexo-
rable pressure of this fixed limit his resistance and his fixation to 
the illness gave way, and now in a disproportionately short time 
the analysis produced all the material which made it possible to 
clear up his inhibitions and remove his symptoms. All the infor-
mation, too, which enabled me to understand his infantile neu-
rosis is derived from this last period of the work, during which 
resistance temporarily disappeared and the patient gave an im-
pression of lucidity which is usually attainable only in hypnosis.5
Here, Freud suggests a somewhat unexpected analogy between the 
brand-new technical measure and the old, long abandoned technique 
– which, also, seemed to find a way to bypass the resistance and to iso-
late the pure historical cause of the present condition. However, there 
is an important difference between the two. In hypnosis, the absence 
of resistance was limited to the state of hypnosis itself, while in the 
second case, the absence produces a situation which is much more dif-
ficult to keep under control; for the latter is, in principle, interminable 
– despite the disappearance of the resistance being only temporary.
Freud was certainly aware of the contrast, so the analogy 
amounts not to the absence of resistance as such but to the lucidity 
that emerged as a result of this opening and which not only relates to 
an unexpected ability to reproduce the past cause – like it did in hyp-
nosis – but also pertains to the continuous production of the material 
in the present. It is worth repeating that the decision to determine the 
fixed time limit by which analysis would end was based on previously 
establishing and managing the transference. Whereas hypnosis func-
tioned as an auxiliary technique, as an instrument of treatment that 
was substantially isolated from the treatment as such, transference ex-
pands over the whole treatment and can be thought of as co-extensive 
with the analytic situation, or better, as its organisational principle. In 
this view, the history of psychoanalysis begins with the abandonment 
of hypnosis; the history of psychoanalysis proper, however, is nothing 
but the process of conceptualising the transference.
With the Freudian sequence of this history being condensed in 
the five great case histories, it is hardly surprising that the problem of 
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transference already appears in the first case, in ‘Dora’. However, it is 
crucial to note that its recognition and theorisation appears as belat-
ed, only in the postscript, as a theoretical compensation for Freud’s 
practical oversight: “I did not succeed in mastering the transference 
in good time,” Freud admits. 
“Owing to the readiness with which Dora put one part of the 
pathogenic material at my disposal during the treatment, I ne-
glected the precaution of looking out for the first signs of trans-
ference, which was being prepared in connection with another 
part of the same material a part of which I was in ignorance.”6 
It was, in fact, not Dora herself but the transference that was one step 
ahead of Freud at this point – and it was precisely this delay that Freud 
was eager to prevent in the later analyses. The almost triumphant tone 
that accompanied his description of setting the fixed time limit in the 
Wolf-Man case could thus be explained by his belief in finally being 
able to master the transference and himself being the one to use trans-
ference as the means to bring the analysis to conclusion. Considering 
this, it is quite telling that the ‘heroic gesture’ is in fact an almost ver-
batim reproduction of Dora’s words in the last session:
She opened the third session with these words: ‘Do you know 
that I am here for the last time today?’ – ‘How can I know, as you 
have said nothing to me about it?’ – ‘Yes. I made up my mind to 
put up with it till the New Year. But I shall wait no longer than 
that to be cured.’ – ‘You know that you are free to stop the treat-
ment at any time. But for today we will go on with our work.7
The heroic gesture of fixing the time limit is therefore an invention of 
Freud’s first great case history. In his first reaction to the given ulti-
matum, Freud still managed to keep up with his position. Later in the 
session, however, the plural pronoun “we” he used in his response was 
increasingly revealed to be nothing but a wishful phantasy. The more 
the session approached the end, the longer Freud’s interventions were 
becoming, and finally it was in fact him ‘going on with their work’. 
The end of the analysis is thus a full-page long and almost comical 
monologue that attempts to provide a convincing interpretation of 
what Dora’s illness was about. To give an extract, it goes like this:
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May you not have thought that [...]. And that now he [...]. But 
you told me yourself [...] So you too wanted to wait for him [...]. 
I imagine that this [...]. You have not even got the right to assert 
[...]. After all, you did not let him finish his speech [...].  And I 
think that is why [...]. So it must have been [...]. You will agree 
that [...]. I know now – and this is what you do not want to be 
reminded of – that you did fancy that Herr K.’s proposals were 
serious, and that he would not leave off until you had married 
him.8i
One could well argue that it was precisely this ending that pushed 
Freud towards recognising the significance of ‘transferences’ (trans-
ference then still being a plural concept) as the “inevitable necessity” 
of any analytic situation. “It is easy,” Freud argues, “to learn how to 
interpret dreams, to extract from the patient’s associations his uncon-
scious thoughts and memories, and to practise similar explanatory 
arts: for these the patient himself will always provide the text.” Trans-
ference, however, is the segment of the analytic situation that first has 
to be detected, or better, which first has to be constructed as an object.
Nevertheless, transference cannot be evaded, since use is made of 
it in setting up all the obstacles that make the material inacces-
sible to treatment, and since it is only after the transference has 
been resolved that a patient arrives at a sense of conviction of the 
validity of the connections which have been constructed during 
the analysis.9
At this early stage of theory, the conviction of the validity can only 
be arrived at after the transference has been resolved. Transference, 
strictly speaking, is thus nothing but an instrument for establishing 
new connections, whereas the conviction itself is a function of the 
external situation. In contrast, the later notion of analytic construc-
i Dora’s response translated comedy into a melodrama: “Dora had 
listened to me without any of her usual contradictions. She seemed to be 
moved; she said goodbye to me very warmly, with the heartiest wishes for 
the New Year, and – came no more.” (Ibid. 108-9) – And as is well known, 
the melodrama repeated itself as a Witz: “On a date which is not a matter of 
complete indifference, on the first of April (times and dates, as we know, were 
never without significance for her), Dora came to see me again: to finish her 
story and to ask for help once more. One glance at her face, however, was 
enough to tell me that she was not in earnest over her request.” (Ibid. 120-1)
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tion is precisely an attempt to think transference and construction 
as homologous: transference is itself already a construction, the con-
struction is internal to transference, its internal repetition, and con-
sequently, the conviction of its validity can only appear from within 
the transference.
THE ‘ULTRA-CLEAR’ RECOLLECTIONS
The general Freudian response to the question of the validity of the 
analytic construction is well known. The patient’s ‘yes’ counts only if 
it is given indirectly, only if it is followed by an immediate acceleration 
of the production of new memories that supplement and expand the 
construction. However, in the last part of the 1937 ‘Construction in 
Analysis’ paper he adds some remarks “which open up a wider per-
spective”:
I have been struck by the manner in which, in certain analyses, 
the communication of an obviously apt construction has evoked 
in the patients a surprising and at first incomprehensible phe-
nomenon. They have had lively recollections called up in them – 
which they themselves have described as ‘ultra-clear’ – but what 
they have recollected has not been the event that was the subject 
of the construction but details relating to that subject. For in-
stance, they have recollected with abnormal sharpness the faces 
of the people involved in the construction or the rooms in which 
something of the sort might have happened, or, a step further 
away, the furniture in such rooms – on the subject of which the 
construction had naturally no possibility of any knowledge.10
To this remark we should add some further remarks. Firstly, the open-
ing of a wider perspective should not be understood separately from 
his general response. This “surprising and at first incomprehensible 
phenomenon” is only the most extreme version of the indirect con-
firmation. Secondly, the patients’ description of recollections as “ul-
tra-clear”, überdeutlich, is not simply a predicate of these recollec-
tions, but rather signifies the impossibility of giving any substantial 
predicate. Thirdly, it is obvious that Freud himself is not convinced of 
how to evaluate these phenomena.
These recollections have themselves led to nothing further and it 
has seemed plausible to regard them as the product of a compro-
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mise. The ‘upward drive’ of the repressed, stirred into activity by 
the putting forward of the construction, has striven to carry the 
important memory-traces into consciousness; but a resistance 
has succeeded, not, it is true, in stopping that movement, but in 
displacing it on to adjacent objects of minor significance.11
This judgment nevertheless holds true only if taken in the register of 
interpretation. In order to grasp the excess of their significance over 
the meaning, or better, in order to express the je-ne-sais-quoi of these 
phenomena, Freud opts for another discursive strategy. In line with 
his usual procedure when faced with phenomena that he feels cannot 
be adequately represented in the usual scientific fashion, he introduces 
an analogy.
These recollections might have been described as hallucinations 
if a belief in their actual presence had been added to their clear-
ness. The importance of this analogy seemed greater when I no-
ticed that true hallucinations occasionally occurred in the case of 
other patients who were certainly not psychotic.12
When he yields to this line of thought, this leads him to the question 
of whether hallucinations themselves might perhaps relate to an ac-
tual event in the patient’s earliest childhood, so that “there [would] 
not only [be] method in madness, as the poet has already perceived, 
but also a fragment of historical truth.” However, we should perhaps 
steer this line of thought in the other direction and contaminate ‘nor-
mality’ with the elements of psychosis. In this sense, the ‘ultra-clarity’ 
of the recollections itself, which cannot be interpreted or taken as a 
sign of belief, can be taken as an intra-mnemonic hallucination, which 
bears witness to another subject within the subject – not to the subject 
of belief in the reality of memory, but to the subject of the certainty 
of its current presence. Although the patient is well aware that what 
it concerns is a memory of a past event, he perceives the recollection 
as factual, as if it were occurring in the present. And it is precisely 
the certainty thereof, the sense of reality, which is of another order, 
unattainable by conventional memory. These recollections affirm the 
construction – however, not by adding new content, but by repeating 
its very formal mechanism. And as far as we hold to the hypothesis 
that construction is an inner repetition of transference, we seem to be 
faced with a series of paradoxical formations that have three features 
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in common: it is impossible to determine their author/agent; it is im-
possible to install them in the frame of linear time, they are simulta-
neously in the present and in the past (perhaps this is the ultimate 
meaning of Freud’s ‘timelessness’ of the unconscious); and their mode 
of existence is repetition.
AFTERWARDSNESS REDOUBLED
How, then, are we to understand the primal scene from the Wolf-Man 
case from this perspective? The primal scene was constructed – by 
both the analyst and the analysand – on the basis of a dream that 
occurred at the age of four and which, again, was marked by the same 
lasting “sense of reality” we have just discussed and which, according 
to Freud’s dream theory, attests “to an occurrence that really took 
place and was not merely imagined.” The dream of the wolves sitting 
on the tree actually plays a double role: on the one hand, the analysis 
of the dream triggers the emergence of the construction in the course 
of the treatment; on the other hand, the dream is not simply a recol-
lection of the primal scene, but the means of its activation.ii
Freud’s discovery of this double causal link between the dream 
and the primal scene corresponds to, or is a consequence of, his deci-
sion, in the published record of the treatment, to focus exclusively on 
the infantile neurosis – despite the fact that the material at his dispos-
al could only have been the Wolf-Man’s current condition, which, in 
turn, was “to be regarded as a condition following on an obsessional 
neurosis which has come to an end spontaneously, but has left a defect 
behind it after recovery.” To put it differently, the current condition 
had no autonomous determination, but was essentially a Folgezustand 
nach einer spontan abgelaufenen, mit Defekt ausgeheilten Zwangsneurose, a 
sequela of the infantile neurosis, i.e. a further complication that fol-
lowed its faulty recovery. The instalment of retroactivity (Nachträglich-
keit, ‘afterwardsness’) as the inner momentum of the primal scene 
nicely demonstrates Freud’s break with his views in the period of ca-
thartic treatment, presented in Studies on Hysteria. While the cathartic 
ii  “We shall further bear in mind that the activation of this scene (I 
purposely avoid the word ‘recollection’) had the same effect as though it were 
a recent experience. The effects of the scene were deferred, but meanwhile 
it had lost none of its freshness in the interval between the ages of one and a 
half and four years. We shall perhaps find in what follows reason to suppose 
that it produced certain effects even at the time of its perception, that is, from 
the age of one and a half onwards.” (Freud 2001 (1918b): 44-5)
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treatment aimed at intervening in linear causality by erasing the ef-
fects of the original trauma, the analytic construction – as the means 
of intervening into retroactivity – argues for the absolutely binding 
and irrevocable character of the intrinsically retroactive trauma.
The retroactive character of the primal scene “in the interval be-
tween the ages of one and a half and four years” is fully recognisable 
in the following sentences:
What was essentially new for him in his observation of his parents’ 
intercourse was the conviction of the reality of castration – a pos-
sibility with which his thoughts had already been occupied previ-
ously. (The sight of the two girls micturating, his Nanya’s threat, 
the governess’ interpretation of the sugar-sticks, the recollection 
of his father having beaten a snake to pieces.) For now, he saw 
with his own eyes the wound of which his Nanya had spoken, 
and understood that its presence was a necessary condition of 
intercourse with his father.13
While other parts of the text seem to imply that the primal scene is 
split between the observation of coitus and its deferred understand-
ing at the age of four, in this case observation itself adopts a retroac-
tive quality. All the events Freud listed in brackets happened after the 
scene took place, but logically precede the observation. The paradox is 
that the “reality of castration” chronologically precedes possibility: by 
observing the event at the age of one and a half, the Wolf-Man recog-
nises the reality of castration, the possibility with which his thoughts 
had already been occupied previously – but in fact later. To put it in 
speculative terms: in the register of the primal scene, reality is a condi-
tion of the possibility of possibility.
In this perspective, two further elements from the analysis are of 
major significance. One can recall that at one moment in the period 
before the introduction of the primal scene, a memory of the seduc-
tion by his sister emerged, which Freud interpreted as an event that 
offered the patient a passive sexual aim. The obvious reading of this 
event as one disturbing the linear development, supposedly aiming at 
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the active sexual aim, seems entirely plausible.iii Its role, however, is 
more ambiguous. It seems, namely, that we should view his seduction 
by his sister as the affirmation of his already passive attitude in observ-
ing the primal scene. This allows Freud to locate the derailment of the 
patient’s sexual development already in the primal scene, which he 
defines – in line with its retroactive character – as the second seduction:
[The sexual development of the patient] was first decisively in-
fluenced by the seduction, and was then diverted by the scene of 
observation of the coitus, which in its deferred action operated 
like a second seduction.14
It appears then that the observation of the scene is essentially passive. 
However, towards the end of the treatment – i.e. after the time limit 
has been determined – a “kind of recollection” emerged from a very 
early age, “timidly and indistinctly,”15 of a nursery-maid, which soon 
produced a proper recollection of a scene of the maid, Grusha, “kneel-
ing on the floor, and beside her a pail and a short broom made of a 
bundle of twigs; he was also there, and she was teasing him or scolding 
him.”16 The further material, produced in the analysis, “fitted together 
spontaneously”17 and filled in the gaps: her scolding was the threat of 
castration, reacting to him having micturated on the floor. Freud’s an-
alytic translation, moreover, provides a significant turn of perspective 
regarding the primal scene:
When he saw the girl on the floor engaged in scrubbing it, and 
kneeling down, with her buttocks projecting and her back hori-
zontal, he was faced once again with the posture which his moth-
er had assumed in the copulation scene. She became his mother 
to him; he was seized with sexual excitement owing to the acti-
vation of this picture; and, like his father (whose action he can 
only have regarded at the time as micturition), he behaved in a 
iii  “But his seduction gives the impression not merely of having encouraged 
his sexual development but of having, to an even greater extent, disturbed 
and diverted it. It offered him a passive sexual aim, which was ultimately 
incompatible with the action of his male genital organ. At the first external 
obstacle, the threat of castration from his Nanya, his genital organization, 
half-hearted as it still was, broke down (at the age of three and a half) and 
regressed to the stage which had preceded it, namely to that of the sadistic-
anal organization, which he might otherwise have passed through, perhaps, 
with as slight indications as other children.” (Ibid. 108)
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masculine way towards her. […] The action of the two-and-a-
half-year-old boy in the scene with Grusha is the earliest effect of 
the primal scene which has come to our knowledge. It represents 
him as copying his father, and shows us a tendency towards de-
velopment in a direction which would later deserve the name of 
masculine.18
Still, if the action (Aktion) in the scene with Grusha is the first effect 
of the primal scene, it is by no means its realisation – it is, strictly 
speaking, not an effect of the primal scene we have been discussing, 
i.e. the one that was activated at the age of four. It might be that this 
recollection served Freud as confirmation of the reality of the primal 
scene. However, such “active” interpretation of the scene (where the 
observer sees himself as the seducer-to-be) is just as insufficient as its 
‘passive’ counterpart.
In the specific case of the Wolf-Man, a patient marked by strong-
ly ambivalent character traits, the primal scene itself had to be “struc-
tured like the Wolf-Man.” According to Freud, the patient’s psyche 
was characterised by three fundamental traits: a) “his tenacity of fix-
ation,” b) “his extraordinary propensity to ambivalence,” and c) “his 
power of maintaining simultaneously the most various and contra-
dictory libidinal cathexes, all of them capable of functioning side by 
side”.19 In order to produce a material record of the formation of the 
subject’s disposition, then, the primal scene had to be structured in 
such a way that it corresponded to the above-mentioned traits – yet 
in a different register. The Wolf-Man’s tenacity of fixation found its 
echo in the inherent retroactivity (or better, Nachträglichkeit, “after-
wardsness”) inscribed within the primal scene itself. His propensity 
to ambivalence was presented as originating in the more structural 
ambivalence of the active and the passive. And lastly, his ability to 
simultaneously maintain the contradictory libidinal cathexes turned 
out to be a consequence of the oscillation between identification with 
the father and the mother in observing the primal scene. It is, again, 
crucial to keep in mind that the primal scene is a construction, and is, 
as such, essentially resistant to any interpretation. Yet this feature is 
nothing but another expression of its ability to capture the peculiari-
ties of the case, which “were revealed by the psycho-analytic treatment 
but were not further elucidated.”
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THE ULTIMATE ANALOGY
No further clarification is possible: theory has reached its limit, and 
in the capacity of ‘producing the impression’ only analogies can come 
close to the construction. According to Freud, the last fundamental 
trait of the patient’s psyche – or better, the ‘trinity’ of all three funda-
mental traits – belongs to “the general character of the unconscious, 
which in his case had persisted into processes that had become con-
scious.”20 Not only is the unconscious of the Wolf-Man unconscious 
– even the conscious part of his psyche acts in accordance with the 
same principles:
So it was that his mental life impressed one in much the same 
way as the religion of Ancient Egypt, which is so unintelligible to 
us because it preserves the earlier stages of its development side 
by side with the end-products, retains the most ancient gods and 
their attributes along with the most modern ones, and thus, as it 
were, spreads out upon a two-dimensional surface [in eine Fläche 
ausbreitet] what other instances of evolution show us in the solid 
[zu einem Tiefengebilde wird].21
The essence of the Wolf-Man can only be described with the ultimate 
analogy, the one encompassing the unconscious as such. Considering 
the magnitude of this claim, it is hardly surprising that Freud tries to 
relativise the analogy, reducing it such that it related merely to the 
affective dimension of the patient’s psychic apparatus, while “in the 
region of pure logic he betrayed, on the contrary, a peculiar skill in 
unearthing contradictions and inconsistencies.”22
The attempt to relativise its scope, however, is compensated for 
by yet another analogy. In the very last paragraphs, after he had al-
ready reached the end of what he had to say about the case, Freud of-
fers an analogy, which seems to serve him as the universal correlate to 
the former, to the one that articulated the pure singularity of the case. 
If one considers the behaviour of the four-year-old child to-
wards the re-activated primal scene, or even if one thinks of the 
far simpler reactions of the one-and-a-half-year-old child when 
the scene was actually experienced, it is hard to dismiss the view 
that some sort of hardly definable knowledge, something, as it 
were, preparatory to an understanding, was at work in the child 
at the time. We can form no conception of what this may have 
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consisted in; we have nothing at our disposal but the single anal-
ogy – and it is an excellent one – of the far-reaching instinctive 
knowledge of animals.23
Above, we have already shown that the construction is able to pro-
duce an ultra-clear recollection of a sort comparable to hallucination. 
Moreover, another analogy – the one we presented at the beginning 
– demonstrated the proximity of the reaction to the setting of the time 
limit and the state produced by the long-abandoned technique of hyp-
nosis. The latter analogy, however, proves to be more than coinciden-
tal. Let us recall the passage from the Introductory Lectures in which 
Freud draws attention to the problem brought by the local liberation 
of the material from resistances occurring in hypnosis:
That state was precisely able to withhold the existence of the re-
sistance from the doctor’s perception. It pushed the resistance 
back, making a certain area free for analytic work, and dammed 
it up at the frontiers of that area in such a way as to be impene-
trable, just as doubt does in obsessional neurosis.24
A very similar metaphor appears once again in ‘Analysis Terminable 
and Interminable’, relating precisely to the Wolf-Man case. The suc-
cess of the employment of the “heroic measure” of fixing the time 
limit, now called the “blackmailing device,” proved to be an illusion. 
The “shrinking up” of his resistances, Freud writes, 
…cannot guarantee to accomplish the task completely. On the 
contrary, we may be sure that, while part of the material will 
become accessible under the pressure of the threat, another part 
will be kept back and thus become buried, as it were, and lost to 
our therapeutic efforts.25
While the first metaphor shows how avoiding the resistance in hypno-
sis deceives us as to the insistence of resistance – as it was dammed up 
at the frontiers and hence ceased to function as resistance, the second 
metaphor makes a further point. The subject in question is no longer 
resistance to the material but the fate of the material itself. Again, in 
the first metaphor the material condensed itself in the resistance-free 
area, and nevertheless remained “whole” – despite being falsely artic-
ulated, while in the second metaphor a certain part of the material be-
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comes buried and lost for good. In the first case the loss is provisional 
and temporary, still allowing for a proper articulation at some future 
point; in the second case, it becomes irreversible. Some part of the 
material is verschüttet, remains ‘blocked’, ‘entombed’, ‘buried alive’ – 
and will only appear as ‘spilling’ over the other part of the material, 
thus ‘overwhelming’ the entire psyche.
This view finds support in a further metaphor. We have already 
called attention to Freud’s understanding of the patient’s current neu-
rosis as Folgezustand, as the secondary complication of the provisional 
recovery. When he returned to the case in ‘Analysis Terminable and 
Interminable’, he already knew that his former view of the case was 
over-optimistic.
The patient has stayed on in Vienna and has kept a place in soci-
ety, if a humble one. But several times during this period his good 
state of health has been interrupted by attacks of illness which 
could only be construed as offshoots of his perennial neurosis. 
Thanks to the skill of one of my pupils, Dr. Ruth Mack Bruns-
wick, a short course of treatment has on each occasion brought 
these conditions to an end. […] Some of these attacks were still 
concerned with residual portions of the transference; and, where 
this was so, short-lived though they were, they showed a distinct-
ly paranoid character. In other attacks, however, the pathogenic 
material consisted of pieces of the patient’s childhood history, 
which had not come to light while I was analysing him and which 
now came away – the comparison is unavoidable – like sutures 
after an operation, or small fragments of necrotic bone. I have 
found the history of this patient’s recovery scarcely less interest-
ing than that of his illness.26
The perennial neurosis and its offshoots, residual portions of trans-
ference, pieces of childhood history, tearing like small fragments of 
necrotic bone: here, Freud manages to summarise all three phases of 
the case (the childhood neurosis and its sequela, the treatment and 
the recovery from the treatment itself), which find embodiment in 
strange objects that are at the same time necrotic and buried alive, 
dead and undead.
However, it would be false to interpret this outcome as the prod-
uct of constructing the primal scene, but rather of Freud’s attempt 
to use the primal scene as an instrument to bring the analysis to a 
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definite end. Should he rather withdraw from making another step? 
Should he rather recognise the primal scene – the singularity of the 
most singular case – as the only possible form of the “independent ex-
istence of the scheme” that he is searching for in the field of phyloge-
netics? Perhaps he should simply affirm the patient’s subjectivisation 
of the primal scene in all its ambivalence and resist the temptation to 
impose on the Wolf-Man its ‘active’ or ‘passive’ interpretation. In-
stead of forcing the end, Freud should perhaps do what was even more 
unexpected and even less in line with his standard procedures. Perhaps 
he should go a step further in imitating Dora and quit the analysis 
himself, thus forcing the patient to contemplate the only image that 
he – otherwise a painter, drawing landscapes and still lifes – produced 
collectively, in the analysis, together with Freud.
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